Nonrespondents were resurveyed in August 1989. The survey consisted of twenty-two questions to solicit HMO managers' views regarding the ability of financial incentives to influence primary care physicians' use of discretionary outpatient laboratory tests and specialist referrals, elective hospitalizations, and other factors that might counterbalance or magnify financial incentives. The survey specifically asked managers to report their views on the general effects of incentives, as well as the effect of any incentives their own HMO might use.
5
Theoretical framework. The conceptual framework used to develop the survey and analyze the mechanisms by which primary care physicians are paid has been described elsewhere. 6 Briefly, incentives vary among HMO organizational models: staff, group, network, or individual practice association (IPA). HMOs may use one or more of three methods of paying primary care physicians: salary, fee for service, and capitation. In some cases, the HMO contracts with a financial intermediary (usually a group practice), which then makes financial arrangements with individual physicians that can differ from the initial payment (this is sometimes called a "three-tiered" HMO).
7 Our survey requested information about the financial incentives applied directly to physicians.
The survey focused on the perceived effectiveness and impact of two common financial incentives-withhold accounts and bonuses-used to supplement the basic methods of paying physicians. In a typical HMO, the insurer divides the premiums received from enrollees into several special-purpose "referral" funds to pay for primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals, and outpatient laboratory testing. Approximately twothirds of all HMOs use withhold accounts, in which a fraction of the payment due to a primary care physician is withheld until the status of the referral funds is determined at the end of the year. The amount withheld is not returned to the physicians if there is a deficit, and primary care physicians who overspend referral funds may incur additional penalties. Most HMOs also use some form of bonus payment to physicians if there are surpluses in these referral accounts or if the physicians meet some standard of productivity. This model has many variations, particularly in staff-model HMOs, which use specific funds for supplementing payments to primary care physicians less often.
Our research also investigates managers' perceptions about the impact of organizational controls designed to attenuate potentially adverse effects of financial incentives on quality. For example, the distribution of withheld funds and surpluses can be based on the performance of individual physicians with individual panels of patients, or based on the experience of pools of physicians with their patients. Pooling risk presumably dissipates incentives to control cost and use. We asked managers D ATAWATCH 209 whether the size of the risk pool makes a difference in how physicians respond to the financial mechanism. We also inquired about the perceived impact of HMOs' quality assurance and peer review.
Ideally, HMOs should seek an incentive structure that leads physicians to balance the trade-off between costs and quality in the way their enrollees most prefer. Minimum feasible cost is not likely to be ideal, nor are goals of achieving the highest possible levels, or the lowest acceptable levels, of quality, access, and amenities. Asking about perceptions of the impact of specific financial incentives on the "appropriateness" of physicians' decisions, therefore, incorporates respondents' subjective judgments about both the ideal level of cost and quality and the effectiveness of incentives in hitting that mark.
Results
Exhibit 1 compares survey respondents to the universe of HMOs in however high, would have a noticeable effect on their physicians' use of outpatient laboratory tests or specialist referrals. (Similar findings for elective hospitalizations approached but did not meet our criteria for significance.) Because staff-model HMOs generally pay primary care physicians by salary, the results of analyses involving either of these two characteristics produce similar results. The level of withholding at which managers would express concern about "appropriateness" of physicians' quality judgments (in contrast to merely conceding that there would be a noticeable effect on resource use) was somewhat higher. (Precisely what "appropriate" means in this context is also a judgment that the respondent must make; we interpret "appropriate" as reflecting a comparison of the benefit a service might provide with its risks and its costs. Different HMO managers have different views on risk/ benefit and cost/ benefit trade-offs.) Only 12 concern about doctors' decisions to hospitalize a patient. However, more than one-third of respondents believed there should be some such concern at levels of withholding equal to 16-30 percent of HMO income, while two-fifths believed such concern should begin only at higher levels of withholding. Again, only one-tenth believed that no level of withholding should be of concern.
The lower the level of withholding in the HMO the respondent actually manages, the more concerned he or she was that withholding might generally cause "inappropriate" decisions by physicians (p=.008). For example, whereas 95 percent of managers of HMOs without withholding accounts were concerned that some level of withholding could cause inappropriate decisions, this proportion dropped to only 63 percent among managers of HMOs that withhold 21-30 percent of payment. There was no difference in level of concern among managers of for-profit and not-for-profit HMOs, or among managers of different types of HMOs.
Impact of risk pools. Only 6 to 7 percent of managers believed that a risk pool of two to five physicians would be sufficient to affect noticeably the impact of a withhold account on physicians' decision making, compared to placing an individual physician at risk (Exhibit 3). (This is true despite the fact that sharing risk with five others reduces the financial effect of any single decision on one's own income by 80 percent, compared to being at risk as an individual.) Approximately one-tenth of respondents did not believe that any size of risk pool could reduce the impact of a withhold account, suggesting that these managers believe that financial risk affects doctors collectively, through group pressure or concern, rather than individually. The remaining respondents (about 85 percent) believed that large risk pools would have such a counterbalancing effect. Managers of HMOs with risk pools of more than five physicians were more likely than those with smaller risk pools to believe that sharing the risk collectively reduces the impact of withholding on physician decision making (91 percent versus 75 percent, p=.028). Managers in HMOs that have chosen large pools apparently presume that such pools appropriately balance incentives. There were no significant differences in views on the impact of risk pools among managers of different types of HMOs, for-profit HMOs, or HMOs with different payment mechanisms.
Impact of bonuses. The results for the level of bonus at which there would be a noticeable effect on ordering behavior were nearly identical to those regarding withholding (Exhibit 3). Managers apparently believe that financial effects are symmetric; whether an action awards income already expected or provides additional income is irrelevant. Fewer than 10 percent of managers believed that an income bonus of less than 5 percent would have a noticeable effect on physicians' ordering behavior, while approximately one-half of respondents believed that a bonus of 5-15 percent would affect ordering behavior. Fewer than one-sixth of managers believed that no level of bonus would have an effect.
Impact of ancillary risk to physicians. Approximately 58 percent of managers had serious concern that some physicians would be influenced to make judgments about discretionary outpatient laboratory tests or specialty referrals that were not always "appropriate" if these physicians were charged the entire cost of these tests and services out of funds otherwise designated to become their own income. This situation occurs when doctors are required to use their capitation payment to pay for these services. Managers in (usually salaried) staff-model HMOs were more likely than their counterparts in HMOs that usually pay capitation or fee for service to be seriously concerned about such a financial incentive (80 percent versus 60 percent, p=.037).
Impact of counterbalancing or magnifying factors. Eighty percent of managers believed that quality assurance mechanisms would be likely to reduce the adverse impact on quality that withhold accounts or bonuses could have. (We did not ask how such mechanisms might affect costs.) There is a correlation between the use of financial incentives and beliefs about the potential impact of quality assurance. Managers of HMOs that have withhold accounts or surplus sharing were more likely than their counterparts who do not have such incentives to believe that quality assurance mechanisms can reduce the potentially negative consequences of financial incentives (81 percent versus 67 percent, p=.007; 79 percent versus 66 percent, p=.002, respectively). In addition, managers who believe in the efficacy of quality assurance mechanisms were less likely to be concerned about charging capitated physicians for laboratory tests and referrals (60 percent versus 78 percent, p=.021). Managers of staffmodel HMOs were less likely than their peers to believe that quality assurance mechanisms could have a beneficial counterbalancing effect (50 percent versus 79 percent, p=.001).
Sixty-one percent of managers believed that doctors practicing alone are more susceptible to the influence of financial incentives than are physicians practicing in groups. A majority of managers of staff-model HMOs (85 percent, p=.008), HMOs without withhold accounts (72 percent, p=.009), and HMOs without surplus sharing accounts (74 percent, p=.019) believed that doctors practicing alone are more susceptible to such influence; only approximately one-half of all managers in other types of HMOs held this belief. It is not clear whether the perception of attenuated incentives in groups reflects the impact of nonfinancial aspects of group "culture," the impact of attenuating incentives by pooling risk, or the ability of groups to adjust financial flows within the group. In D ATAWATCH 215 "three-tiered" arrangements, independent physician groups can and do pay individual doctors in ways different from the payment methods used by the HMO for the group as a whole. Managers believe that quality assurance mechanisms are the most effective way to counterbalance the impact of financial incentives (Exhibit 4). Peer review and large risk pools were the mechanisms next most frequently cited as effective. Very few managers (2 percent) felt that limiting the number of HMO patients in a primary care physician's patient panel would counterbalance the impact of financial incentives. Managers of HMOs in which physicians are individually at risk for the loss of withheld funds were less likely than their peers to believe that large risk pools are the most effective counterbalancing measures to financial incentives (3 percent versus 18 percent, p=.044).
Finally, a majority of managers (58 percent) believed that financial incentives in their own HMOs would have no effect on physicians' decisions to order preventive health care services compared with traditional fee-for-service practice. Managers in HMOs that offer bonuses were more likely to believe that financial incentives increase the provision of preventive services (39 percent versus 19 percent, p=.002).
Discussion
Is it the competition's concern? An important theme in the survey responses is that managers tend to view the level and type of incentives used in their own HMOs as considerably less worrisome than those used by other HMOs, regardless of the type of incentive considered. For example, although managers of HMOs that use withholds were more likely than others to believe that withholding accounts do have an effect on the ordering behavior of individual physicians, they were less concerned about the possibility of adverse quality effects of that level of withholding. There are several possible explanations of these findings. One explanation is that different HMOs may define "appropriate" care differently, perhaps reflecting different beliefs about the effectiveness of care, values that managers or the plans' enrollees attach to quality relative to cost, or attitudes toward risk. Second, greater experience with certain mechanisms may influence both perception and the accuracy of perception; what is less well known may seem more threatening than what is familiar. Moreover, managers may be able to configure their own incentive mechanisms over time to remove the negative aspects that concern them. Third, there may be "cognitive dissonance." 9 People may come to change their beliefs about the potentially adverse effects of things they must accept, particularly if those impacts are rare or can be attributed to other causes. While the first two explanations are benign, the third indicates the possibility of misperceptions with undesirable consequences. HMO managers should be alerted to the possibility that their views on financial incentives and counterbalancing factors might be biased.
The phenomenon of worrying more about the behavior of one's competitor than about one's own was particularly strong in one instance: nonprofit HMO managers believed that for-profit HMO managers are more likely to use methods to intensify the impact of financial incentives. Only 26 percent of managers of for-profit plans agreed with this statement, compared with 75 percent of managers of not-for-profit plans. However, despite the concern about competitors, few managers-even those who found incentives to be potentially troublesome-want governmental regulation. Perhaps they feel that use of less desirable incentives by their competitors enhances their own competitive position, or perhaps D ATAWATCH 217 they fear that regulation, once begun, would affect them as well. This is consistent with the finding that managers tend not to worry about their own incentive mechanisms; although HMO managers may admit concern about financial incentives, they seem to have faith in their own ability to manage them as well. Finally, it may be that "concerns" deal more with possibilities than with certainties of adverse effects on care, so that managers may see small benefit from restrictions to deal with a problem thought to be of minor importance. Impact of HMO model. Managers of staff-model HMOs had somewhat different opinions about the impact of financial incentives and counterbalancing factors than their counterparts not in staff-model plans. (Staffmodel HMOs are also much more likely to be nonprofit.) Staff-model managers were more concerned about the effect on quality of placing capitated physicians at risk for the cost of outpatient laboratory tests or specialty referrals, and they were less likely to believe that quality assurance mechanisms could counterbalance the impact of financial incentives. They were more likely to believe that doctors practicing alone are more susceptible to the influence of financial incentives than are physicians practicing in groups, and they are less likely to oppose governmental regulation of HMO incentive devices. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managers of staff-model HMOs believe that the distinct style of practice in a staff-model HMO-the presence of a peer group in close proximity and high levels of control by the HMO-is the best way to practice. It is also consistent with the finding that HMO managers view the incentives (or lack of incentives) used in their own HMOs as less worrisome than incentives used by others.
Presence of thresholds. Another clear implication of the results is that HMO managers believed that the impact of withhold accounts, bonus payments, and risk pools are subject to thresholds below which little or no effect is expected. For example, more than 90 percent of respondents reported no noticeable effect on the ordering behavior of physicians at risk as individuals if the level of withheld funds is below 5 percent of total HMO payment. Conversely, most respondents (nearly four-fifths) believed that there would be a noticeable effect when withholding represents 5-30 percent of total HMO payment, a relatively narrow corridor. Distinct thresholds can also be discerned for the size of the risk pool necessary to reduce the impact of withhold accounts on physicians' decision making and the level of bonus payment at which there would be a noticeable effect on ordering behavior. In particular, few managers believed that risk pools of only five physicians or fewer would counterbalance the impact of individual withhold accounts on decision making.
These findings indicate several things. First, future research should not on August 26, 2017 by HW Team focus simply on whether or not certain financial incentives exist, but rather on the intensity at which these incentives are used. Second, congressional concern about the presence or absence of physicians at risk as individuals in HMOs may be misdirected. Rather, such concern may be more appropriate when physicians are members of small risk pools and when the incentive devices put a large fraction of cost at risk. The perception that it makes no difference to reduce the physician's share of the impact of clinical decisions from 100 percent of cost to, say, twenty cents on the dollar (as in a pool of five equal sharers) suggests that other "peer group" effects on quality in risk groups larger than five are felt to be strong enough to offset excessive incentive effects on quality.
Policy Implications
The possibility that there are thresholds below which there is little or no effect from financial incentives is important and requires further research. Policymakers (in implementing or considering rules for Medicare HMOs) may wish to focus their attention on determining whether such thresholds exist and, if so, limiting regulation of incentives to those above the threshold. However, instead of prohibiting whole categories of incentives, limiting any regulation to "strong" versions of them may make more sense. In addition, when HMO managers set out to design financial incentives for their HMOs, they should be aware that their perception of the impact of these incentives may be influenced by a desire to view the incentives they use as benign. It will be particularly important in future research to ascertain HMO physicians' perceptions about the impact of the financial incentives and their counterbalancing factors.
Specific findings from this study may help in the design of contractual arrangements between HMOs and physicians. For example, many believe that the number of HMO patients in a primary care physician's patient panel is an important element of how physicians respond to financial incentives-the larger the number of patients, the more attention physicians pay to their contractual obligations to the HMO. However, few respondents to this survey felt that keeping a primary care physician's patient panel small would affect the impact of financial incentives. It may be more important, therefore, for policymakers to look toward other ways of ensuring that financial incentives are effective. Conversely, increasing the size of a physician's patient panel may be a good way to strengthen financial incentives without increasing the likelihood of adverse effects.
Federal policymakers should not attempt to "fine tune" HMO incentives. This responsibility falls to HMO managers, who should retain such managerial discretion because the most appropriate incentives will vary D ATAWATCH 219 with the organizational form of the HMO and other factors. However, Congress does set up rules for Medicare patients and for those HMOs that seek to be federally qualified. Policymakers have responsibilities to Medicare beneficiaries or to consumers who use federal qualification as a signal about which HMO they should choose. They must protect consumers against incentives that threaten quality to a degree more than any knowledgeable consumer would choose, even if premiums were lowered by the incentive. The results reported here should help federal policymakers to target efforts toward this goal and to avoid overregulation. They may also help state policymakers who regulate HMOs as insurers and who may intervene with more detailed constraints.
The attempt to design financial and other measures that encourage managed care physicians to practice in an appropriately cost-effective fashion is crucial to the goal of making good use of health care resources. Sophisticated statistical analyses, physicians' and managers' opinions, case studies, and other types of research all should be used to supplement the intuition of experienced managers about the impact of different mechanisms to influence physician behavior.
